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Introduction
Global greenhouse gas emissions are on a steeper growth 
trajectory than assumed in most scenarios that underlie 
current international policy discussions and negotiations.1 
Effective global climate change mitigation action will require 
speed, depth and breadth well beyond any efforts seen to 
date, and will need to involve all major emitters, including 
developing countries (Garnaut et al., 2008). To achieve a 
comprehensive global agreement at or after the Copenhagen 
climate conference, a principles-based framework for 
mitigation is needed. Here we outline a system that adds up 
to a global solution, and that could be broadly acceptable. 
It involves internationally tradable emissions rights allocated 
across countries, with allocations moving over time to equal 
per capita allocations. Developing countries would receive 
increasing emissions entitlements, linked to their GDP 
growth, for a transitional period. Binding emissions targets 
would apply to all developed and high-income countries plus 
China from the outset. Other developing countries, but not 
least developed countries, would be required to take on one-
sided targets below their business-as-usual trajectory, and they 
would expect to benefit from international trade in allocations. 
Additional building blocks would be commitments by high-
income countries to invest in low-emissions technologies 
and to provide additional assistance for climate change 
adaptation in developing countries, and sectoral agreements 
to place a comparable carbon price on emissions-intensive, 
trade-exposed industries in all countries.
Why quantitative commitments?
Any agreement on a global goal for climate change mitigation 
requires that effort to be distributed among countries. Any 
agreement will arise from negotiations involving in particular 
the major emitters, especially China and the United 
States, but there are basic principles that would facilitate 
agreement. The first choice to make is what form national 
level commitments should take, with the main alternatives 
being price-based and quantity-based commitments (see 
Garnaut, 2008, chapter 9 for an extended discussion). Price-
based commitments would involve setting an internationally 
agreed tax rate on greenhouse gas emissions (Cooper, 2000; 
Nordhaus, 2008), or hybrid systems with quantitative caps 
that have a government-backed price cap as an override 
(McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002; Pizer, 2002). 
The main argument for price control is the inevitable 
uncertainty about the costs of  reaching any particular 
quantitative emissions outcome. Other arguments in favour 
of  agreements on prices are that international financial flows 
and the question of  distribution of  effort between countries 
would be avoided, that transaction costs would be low and 
political distortions limited. On the other hand, tax rates 
would need to be adjusted from time to time in light of  the 
emissions reductions achieved, and in light of  new scientific 
knowledge that might demand limitation of  emissions to 
defined levels, for example to avoid specific tipping points in 
the climate system if  they can be identified.
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Ultimately, a quantity-based system of  commitments, or 
‘cap-and-trade’, is more likely to succeed at the international 
level than a price-based one, for a number of  reasons. 
First, it builds on existing international structures. The 
Kyoto Protocol, though nowhere near as effective as needed, 
did establish an architecture around emissions targets, and 
quantitative targets frame the current negotiations about a 
post-2012 framework. The urgency of  the climate challenge 
argues for building on existing efforts, not overturning them. 
Second, the option to differentiate efforts, and to trade 
emissions rights internationally, can provide a strong incentive 
for developing countries to come on board. Differentiation 
under cap-and-trade is possible without sacrificing efficiency, 
because differentiated targets do not affect the common 
international price that prevails under trading. Third, 
quantitative targets control emissions levels more directly 
than taxes, and are thus more easily communicated. Fourth, 
they can be implemented with flexibility over time to avoid 
cost blow-outs. And finally, emissions target commitments 
retain countries’ freedom to implement whatever mix of  
policies they choose domestically, in contrast to an agreement 
on a specific tax rate. Also, international comparison and 
verification of  tax effort across countries would be fraught.
A principle for allocating emissions entitlements 
The crucial question in any cap-and-trade system is how 
emissions entitlements are allocated, and it is the question 
on which a future international climate agreement is going 
to swim or sink. The Kyoto Protocol allocated emissions 
entitlements essentially on an ad hoc basis, with a narrow 
range of  differentiation around 1990 base years. An approach 
like that would be unacceptable to most developing countries, 
as it locks in historical patterns of  usage of  the atmosphere, 
which are strongly skewed in favour of  current developed 
countries. Developed countries account for most of  the 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere, 
while developing countries on average and in most cases have 
relatively low levels of  emissions per person, but strongly 
growing populations and economies. 
This implies that emissions entitlements in developing 
countries would need to continue growing for some time, 
albeit at a slower rate than would be the case without climate 
change mitigation, while rich countries’ entitlements would 
need to fall. 
Any system for differentiating the global effort that is put 
forward in earnest needs to add up to a global total that limits 
the risk of  climate change to acceptable levels. Formulas can 
be devised that coincide with the interests of  any particular 
nation, but they will not be broadly acceptable elsewhere. 
By contrast, principles that are broadly acceptable and can 
garner support from heads of  government in the lead-up to 
the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference need to be simple, 
transparent and readily applicable. They will need to be seen 
as fair, and that will mean that they will need to give much 
weight to population, acknowledging the stark differences 
in per capita emissions between developed and developing 
countries that exist today. And they will need to be seen as 
practical, which implies long periods of  adjustment towards 
population-based allocations.
Various proposals for differentiating targets have been 
made, for example around principles of  responsibility and 
capacity and effort (see discussion in Garnaut, 2008, chapter 
9). However, many of  these approaches include complex or 
contestable indicators and computations. It is difficult to see 
how broad international agreement about what is equitable, 
especially in the longer term, could be formed in anything 
but a very simple framework. 
The only approach that seems to have a sufficient degree 
of  perceived fairness as well as practicality is a gradual move 
to equal per capita emissions entitlements, starting from the 
status quo. Anything but a move to equal per capita allocations 
would not be acceptable to most developing countries. In fact, 
a gradual move to equal per capita allocations may be seen as 
unduly favouring current and past high per capita emitters, 
as it does not address the issue of  historical responsibility. 
International funding for climate change mitigation by 
developed countries, discussed further below, would provide 
additional support to developing countries (as suggested by 
Bhagwati, 2006) and help make a gradual shift to equal per 
capita allocations defendable. 
The per capita principle may seem challenging in 
developed countries that currently have well above global 
average per capita emissions, including Australia and New 
Zealand. Yet it is broadly consistent with the emerging longer-
term emissions goals of  developed countries. For example, 
the mid-century emissions goals announced or anticipated 
for the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States equate 
to per capita emissions of  between 3 and 5 tonnes. They are 
much below current levels in these countries of  between 
11 (UK, Japan) and 22 tonnes (US) per person, below the 
current global average of  6 tonnes per person, and close to 
the 2–3 tonnes per capita average implied by stabilisation 
scenarios put forward by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, together with United Nations population 
projections. 
Importantly, the actual effort required by a move to equal 
per capita allocations compared to targets framed in absolute 
terms relates not just to the starting levels of  per capita 
emissions, but also to the rate of  population growth. Countries 
with high per capita emissions but growing populations, such 
as Australia, but also the US and Canada, will find that their 
population growth reduces the extent of  emissions reductions 
which receive greater absolute allocations if  emissions targets 
are framed in per capita terms. 
A modified contraction and convergence approach
A gradual move to equal per capita allocations is often referred 
to as ‘contraction and convergence’ (Global Commons 
Institute, 2000): a contracting global annual emissions budget, 
with national allocations converging to equal allocations per 
person everywhere. This basic principle has been promoted 
by India and found support in recent times in Europe, and 
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variations of  the approach have figured in recent reports on 
the way forward for global climate negotiations (Stern, 2008; 
Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). Allocations 
would decrease continually for countries above the per capita 
global average. For countries below the average they would 
increase for some time – albeit typically at a rate slower than 
unconstrained emissions growth – before decreasing in line 
with the global (average) emissions. 
Equity in this system is addressed simply and transparently. 
Slow convergence favours current high emitters as it 
preserves current patterns for longer. Fast convergence 
favours countries that are now below the global average, as 
it allows their allocations to grow faster until reaching the 
(falling) global average. Thus the convergence date becomes 
the main equity lever in the system.
An important modification to a pure contraction and 
convergence system concerns rapidly growing middle-income 
countries, especially those that are already close to the global 
average per capita emissions, such as China. They would find 
it difficult to immediately stop and reverse the growth in per 
capita emissions. To enable these countries to come on board 
an international agreement immediately, ‘headroom’ would 
need to be provided in emissions allocations for a transitional 
period, to allow for a more gradual adjustment. Emissions 
allocations could, for example, be linked to actual growth of  
the economy, making them ‘intensity targets’ for a limited 
period of  time. 
In the Garnaut Review (2008), the rule considered was 
that developing countries’ emissions allocations would 
grow at half  the rate of  their GDP, if  this is greater than 
the growth in allocations under direct convergence. The 
‘headroom’ rule would apply until 2020 or until developing 
countries reach the developed country average per capita 
allocations, whichever occurs first. Emissions growth at half  
the rate of  GDP growth is implied by China’s announced 
goals for reductions in energy intensity and its commitment 
to increase the proportionate role of  low-emissions energy 
sources, and that could be an important factor in making the 
system work for the world’s largest emitter. 
Starting levels of  emissions from which countries 
converge are also important. In the Garnaut Review model, 
convergence begins in 2013. For Annex I (developed) 
countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the starting 
point is their Kyoto target levels, so that countries do not 
gain an advantage from not complying with Kyoto. The 
one exception to this is successor states to the former Soviet 
Union, whose Kyoto targets are well above their business-as-
usual levels. The former Soviet Union, the United States and 
all non-Annex I (developing) countries converge from their 
no-mitigation levels in 2012.
Computations undertaken for the Garnaut  Review, using 
2050 as the convergence date and the rules sketched above, 
imply a reduction of  developed countries’ average 
emissions entitlements, compared to 2000 levels, 
by around 15% at 2020 and around 75% by 2050 
(Garnaut, 2008, chapter 9). This is for a global 
emissions trajectory consistent with stabilisation 
at 550 part per million (ppm) CO2-equivalent. 
For a more ambitious global trajectory consistent 
with stabilisation at 450ppm, developed countries’ 
average emissions entitlements are reduced by 
around 30% (2020) and 85% (2050) compared 
to 2000 levels. Within the group of  developed 
countries, reduction numbers are differentiated 
because of  differences in starting levels (Kyoto target levels 
or 2012 projected actuals) relative to 2000 levels; the starting 
levels of  emissions per capita, with high emitting countries 
subject to greater reductions; and projected population 
growth, with absolute reductions greater for countries with 
low or negative population growth. 
Developing countries as a group in this model increase 
their emissions entitlements to 2020 by around 90% from 
2000 levels and by around 20% compared to 2012 levels. 
2050 entitlements are 5% below 2012 levels under the 
550ppm scenario, and 45% below 2012 actual levels (though 
still above 2000 levels) under the 450ppm scenario. Individual 
developing countries’ growth or contraction of  entitlements 
differs strongly, in the longer term depending especially on 
the starting level of  per capita emissions and population 
growth, and in the short term to an extent on GDP growth 
rates.
In considering principles for allocating emissions 
entitlements and thus sharing the burden of  mitigation effort, 
it is important to remember that these entitlements would 
be tradable between countries. That is, individual countries 
would be able to remain above their allocated levels by buying 
extra allocations from other countries that in turn remain 
within their allocations. Trading is a prerequisite for overall 
economic efficiency of  the scheme, as it allows the price to 
equilibrate internationally. It would be particularly important 
in the transition towards equal per capita entitlements, when 
it may not be feasible or affordable in particular economies 
to change existing systems fast enough to reduce emissions 
in line with contracting emissions allocations, while other 
countries may find that with policy action they can remain 
comfortably below their allocations. 
In the longer term, very low per capita emissions levels 
globally would make large deviations from the global per 
capita average for large emitters infeasible, but nevertheless 
there may be some countries that continue at significantly 
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different per capita emissions levels due to structural reasons. 
For example, countries that are home to export industries 
that produce emissions even with advanced low-emissions 
technologies – possibly including some forms of  agriculture 
and mining – would cover their excess emissions through 
purchases of  emissions entitlements from countries that do 
not have these industries and that import the emissions-
intensive goods. 
A transition period for developing countries
The period up to 2020 should be regarded as a transition 
period for developing countries. This is reflected in the 
Garnaut Review proposals in two ways. First, as already 
mentioned, emissions are allowed to grow to 2020 in 
developing countries at half  the rate of  GDP. 2020 emission 
entitlements in developing countries are about 10% below 
business-as-usual levels, with the corresponding figure for 
developed countries implying a much greater reduction 
below business-as-usual. 
Second, all high-income countries as well as China, 
because of  its financial capacity and global status as the 
world’s largest emitter and emerging superpower, would 
be required to submit themselves to binding economy-wide 
emissions constraints.  Other developing countries, however, 
should be required only to take on one-sided commitments 
until 2020. A one-sided commitment allows a country to 
benefit from the international sale of  purchases if  it exceeds 
the target but it is not forced to buy permits if  it fails to 
meet its target. This no-loss arrangement for developing 
countries would again help facilitate developing countries’ 
participation. 
Least developing countries would not be 
asked to sign up to economy-wide targets at 
all, but would be expected to participate in 
relevant sectoral agreements (see below), and 
would continue to host Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)-type offset projects. The 
CDM would thus become, as it should be, 
a mechanism to benefit the least developed 
countries and not an arrangement to engage 
the giants of  the developing world; even so it 
would need to be strengthened compared to 
today’s arrangements. Overall, developing 
world emissions are growing so rapidly that 
reductions in their emissions compared to business-as-usual 
are needed in addition to absolute reductions in developed 
countries, and not, as under the CDM, as a substitute for 
reductions in developed country emissions.
Complementary commitments
Other policy mechanisms besides emissions targets and 
trading will be needed to achieve comprehensive international 
mitigation action at sufficient speed. They consist principally 
of  commitments by high-income countries to make funding 
available for technology development and for developing 
countries to deal with climate change impacts, but also of  
commitments to sectoral emissions taxation by all countries 
that have significant industries producing emissions-intensive 
traded commodities. 
First, a global agreement on minimum commitments 
to investment in new low-emissions technologies is needed 
to ensure an adequate level of  funding of  research, 
development and commercialisation. Energy research and 
development funding have fallen over time, despite the clear 
need to invest in new technologies to support the shift to a 
decarbonised energy system. Only recently has technology 
research funding received greater attention, with a number 
of  funding initiatives launched. Widespread implementation 
of  national emissions targets and emissions pricing 
would not fully take care of  the technology development 
funding, because of  the public good aspects of  many new 
technologies, and because markets for clean technologies are 
missing in developing countries at least in the interim. The 
Garnaut Review proposed an International Low-Emissions 
Technology Commitment requiring high-income countries to 
allocate a small proportion of  GDP above a threshold. They 
would retain flexibility in the use of  funds provided, which 
could be spent domestically or abroad, on public funding 
for low-emissions research and development, for technology 
commercialisation, or to kick-start the mitigation efforts of  
developing countries. Given the need to support developing 
country mitigation, the Garnaut Review proposes that a 
minimum proportion of  the commitment be expended in 
developing countries, say 50%. An annual global amount of  
US$100 billion is proposed, which would today require the 
50 richest countries to contribute on average 0.24% of  their 
GDP to technology funding.
Second, sectoral agreements would seek to ensure that 
the main trade-exposed, emissions-intensive industries face 
comparable carbon prices across the world. Such sectoral 
agreements, with broad international participation, would 
ensure that countries which lacked economy-wide targets, 
such as the least developed countries, would not achieve an 
unfair advantage in trade in emissions-intensive activities. 
They would thereby help avoid economic distortions and 
political pressures in those countries that implement carbon 
pricing ahead of  others, because the fear of  ‘carbon leakage’ 
– that is, the artificial movement of  industrial activities to 
countries that do not impose carbon penalties – would be 
Achieving effective global climate change 
mitigation action will be extremely difficult, 
and time is running out to meet ambitious 
targets for atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations.  
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alleviated. Sectoral agreements should be kept simple and 
focused on ensuring the emergence of  appropriate and 
comparable price signals. In the absence of  economy-wide 
emissions pricing, each government would at a minimum 
impose a carbon tax on the main producers in each 
industry producing emissions-intensive tradable goods. This 
common tax rate in itself  does not allow differentiation of  
commitments between countries, but differentiation would 
not generally be necessary in industries where producers are 
part of  a global market. National governments would keep 
the revenue, giving them an incentive to follow through with 
the commitment. Sectoral agreements would apply to key 
traded energy-intensive commodities, including metals, but 
the same principles could also apply to international civil 
aviation and shipping, and, in a different context and with 
greater institutional difficulties in implementation, land-use 
change and forestry emissions.
Third, an International Adaptation Assistance 
Commitment would provide new adaptation assistance to 
developing countries that join the mitigation programmes. 
Adaptation needs will differ strongly between countries, 
with activities in the core development agenda generally 
also beneficial in helping to deal with climate change 
impacts, and it is difficult to estimate the financing needs for 
future adaptation. Given the close similarities between the 
development and adaptation agendas, it is advisable not to 
force a division between the two, and there is no need for 
a new global adaptation financing infrastructure. Instead, 
developed countries should commit to providing adaptation 
support to developing countries in addition to current and 
planned development assistance. In the Pacific region, 
enhancing labour mobility in the region will be particularly 
important to help economies diversify and insure against 
climate change risk. 
Conclusions
Achieving effective global climate change mitigation 
action will be extremely difficult, and time is running out 
to meet ambitious targets for atmospheric greenhouse 
gas concentrations. Nevertheless, it is possible to construct 
systems that ‘add up’ to the required global effort, and that 
should be broadly acceptable to the majority of  countries, 
given increased realisation of  the gravity of  climate change 
risks. Here we have outlined a system of  near-global coverage 
of  efficient emissions control policies, geared in particular to 
facilitate early developing country participation in reducing 
emissions below business-as-usual levels, a fundamental 
precondition for effectively limiting global emissions. 
It has as its centerpiece national quantitative commit-
ments, with international tradable emissions entitlements 
derived from a model of  gradual convergence to equal per 
capita emissions entitlements. For a transition period, extra 
headroom would be allocated to fast-growing developing 
countries, and most developing countries would have 
‘one-sided’ commitments that safeguard them against any 
unexpected difficulties in meeting targets. These provisions 
could make the system attractive to developing countries. 
Alongside quantitative commitments stand effective sectoral 
agreements in the short term, and commitments by developed 
countries to finance technology development and deployment 
as well as adaptation in the context of  development. 
Such a system would operationalise the principle of  
common but differentiated responsibilities in a framework 
that requires and incentivises effective and efficient mitigation 
action from all countries in the near future, but that 
differentiates the effort in line with development status. It will 
always be possible to construct different systems, including 
ones that benefit particular countries by easing the burden 
placed on them, but any system put forward will have to add 
up to achievement of  a global environmental outcome, while 
being broadly acceptable to most countries. 
1 This article draws heavily on the report by the Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut, 
2008), especially chapter 9 and also chapter 10.
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